Abstract. In the paper a mixed Nash equilibrium (NE) in bimatrix games is considered.
Introduction.
The aim of this paper is to apply in game theory some properties of a saddle point matrix, denoted by (A, e), where the block matrix is defined as follows:
and the top-left block is a matrix A∈R n x n , the top-right block e is the column vector with all entries of ones, the bottom-left block is e transposed, and the bottom-right block has the single entry 0. If A is symmetric, then (A, e) may be interpreted as the bordered
Hessian of a standard quadratic program over the standard simplex, and it is called the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker matrix of the program, which is known to have a large spectrum of applications (for a review see, for instance, Bomze, 1998 ).
The matrix obtained from A by replacing the i-th row with e T is denoted by A i , and A j stands for the matrix of A with the j-th column replaced by e, and M/A denotes
and A is nonsingular, then 
In other words, the NE is a set of actions p which must be the best response to all strategies, especially to itself. A mixed strategy is a probability vector x specifying the probability with which each pure strategy is played. If these probabilities are all strictly positive, x is said to be completely mixed. Denote by E(A) the expected payoff of the given game
Properties of (A, e)
In the paper we always assume that A, E∈R n x n (n > 1), and E = ee 
Proposition 3. For any real numbers α, β the determinant of the matrix αA + βE can be expressed as follows:
Proposition 4. The determinant of (A, e) is equal to the difference of the determinants of A and A + E:
Proposition 5. If A is nonsingular, then the following equalities hold true:
Note that nonsingularity of A does not say anything about singularity or nonsingularity of the saddle point matrix (A, e). In the case above the condition of nonsingilarity of (A, e) contains (17).
Proposition 6.
If A is nonsingular and for some α, β the linear combination αA + βE is also nonsingular, then 
Proposition 9. If det(A, e) ≠ 0, then the rank of A is either n or n −1:
The converse is not true, but if A is both symmetric and positive definite, then it immediately follows from (10) 
The decompositions imply that if A is nonsingular then:
If A∈R n x n is singular and rank A = n-1 then A can be replaced by nonsingular matrix αA + βE for some α, β∈R, and which does not change the optimizer (see also 
and in any mixed equilibrium in this game in which this player's strategy is completely mixed, the players payoff E(A) is given by
and coefficients of the equilibrium profile p have the form
Proof. In an equilibrium in which row player's strategy is completely mixed, the mixed strategy y used by the other player is such that Ay = E(A)e. Since the entries of the vector y sum up to one, E(A)e = E(A)Ey. Therefore [A -E(A)E]y = 0, which implies that
On the other hand, setting α = 1 and β = -E(A) in (3) gives
Since det(A, e) ≠ 0 by assumption, we get (19). ■
The system of equations
expresses the double condition that each of the row player's n pure strategies give the same payoff when played against p, and the entries of p sum up to one. It follows immediately from Cramer's rule that (21) and (19) imply (20): 
